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Abstract: Investors systematically deviate from rationality when making 
financial decisions, yet the mechanisms responsible for these deviations have 
not been identified. Using event-related fMRI, we examined whether 
anticipatory neural activity would predict optimal and suboptimal choices in a 
financial decision-making task. We characterized two types of deviations from 
the optimal investment strategy of a rational risk-neutral agent as risk-seeking 
mistakes and risk-aversion mistakes. Nucleus accumbens activation preceded 
risky choices as well as risk-seeking mistakes, while anterior insula activation 
preceded riskless choices as well as risk-aversion mistakes. These findings 
suggest that distinct neural circuits linked to anticipatory affect promote different 
types of financial choices, and indicate that excessive activation of these circuits 
may lead to investing mistakes. Thus, consideration of anticipatory neural 
mechanisms may add predictive power to the rational actor model of economic 
decision-making. 
Short Title: Neural Basis of Financial Risk-Taking 
Keywords: affect, accumbens, insula, risk, decision, choice, rational, finance, 
economics, fMRI, human. 
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Individual investors systematically deviate from optimal behavior, which 
could influence asset valuation (Daniel et al., 2002; Hirshleifer, 2001; Odean, 
1998). The causes of these deviations have not been established, but emotion 
may have some influence. While some research has examined the role of 
emotion in decision-making (Camerer et al., 2005; Loewenstein et al., 2001), 
and economists have begun to incorporate emotion into models of individual 
choice (Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; Caplin and Leahy, 2001), scientists still 
lack a mechanistic account of how emotion might influence choice. 
Understanding such mechanisms might help theorists to specify more accurate 
models of individual decision-making, which could ultimately improve the design 
of economic institutions so as to facilitate optimal investor behavior.  
Here, we sought to examine whether neural activation linked to 
anticipatory affect would predict financial choices. At least two hypotheses have 
been put forth regarding the role of affect in decision-making. According to one 
account, undifferentiated arousal might be related to both risk-seeking and risk 
aversion (Lo and Repin, 2002). However, according to a second account, 
positive aroused feelings associated with anticipation of gain (e.g., “excitement”) 
may promote risk-taking, whereas negative aroused feelings associated with 
anticipation of loss (e.g., “anxiety”) may promote risk-aversion (Knutson et al., 
2005; Paulus et al., 2003).  
Recent evidence from human brain imaging implies that affect evoked by 
the anticipation of gain and loss may carry distinct neural signatures. 
Specifically, the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) of the ventral striatum shows 
proportional activation during anticipation of monetary gains (Breiter et al., 
2001; Knutson et al., 2001), and this activation correlates with positive aroused 
affect (Bjork et al., 2004; Knutson et al., 2005; Martinez et al., 2003). Neural 4 
markers of anticipatory negative affect have not been as clearly delineated, but 
the anterior insula provides a candidate substrate for a number of reasons. 
First, brain imaging studies have consistently reported activation of the anterior 
insula during anticipation of physical pain, which correlates with self-reported 
state anxiety (Buchel and Dolan, 2000; Chua et al., 1999; Ploghaus et al., 
1999). Second, the anterior insula shows activation during anticipation of 
aversive visual stimuli (Simmons et al., 2004). Third, the anterior insula shows 
activation during risky choice in games involving nonmonetary incentives, which 
correlates with subsequent risk-aversion and trait measures of negative 
aroused affect (Paulus et al., 2003). Although the anterior insula is also 
sensitive to attentional and other demands (Phan et al., 2002), a recent review 
suggests that activation in this region is more common under negative than 
positive affective circumstances (Wager et al., 2003). 
The goals of this experiment were first, to determine whether anticipatory 
activity in the NAcc and anterior insula would differentially predict risk-seeking 
versus risk-averse choices, and second, to examine whether activation in these 
regions would precede both suboptimal and optimal choices. Two studies have 
correlated anticipatory neural activation with choice, but both involved choices 
that occurred in the context of social interactions (which might prove more 
susceptible to affective biases) rather than financial decisions (Fehr et al., 2004; 
Sanfey et al., 2003). Another study demonstrated a correlation between neural 
activation and immediate versus delayed reward choices, but did not investigate 
risky choices (McClure et al., 2004).  
To investigate the influence of anticipatory neural activation on financial 
risk-taking, we combined a dynamic investment task with event-related fMRI. 
We compared subjects’ actual investment choices during the task to those of a 5 
rational risk-neutral agent who maximizes expected utility. Suboptimal choices 
were defined as deviations from this model, and included both “risk-seeking 
mistakes” (in which people take risks when they should not) and “risk-aversion 
mistakes” (in which people do not take risks when they should).  
We designed a novel task to elicit a range of investment behaviors, 
including risk-seeking and risk-averse financial choices. The Behavioral 
Investment Allocation Strategy (BIAS) Task consisted of 20 blocks of 10 trials 
each (see Figure 1). During each trial, subjects first saw two stocks and a bond 
(Anticipation), and then chose one when the word “Choose” appeared above 
the assets (Choice). Then subjects waited for a brief period (Wait), after which 
their earnings for that trial and total earnings were displayed (Outcome). These 
were followed by a display of the outcomes of all assets on that trial (Market), 
and a fixation cross (Fixation; see Figure 1).  
At the beginning of each block (indicated by a cue), one of the two stocks 
was randomly assigned to be the "good" stock, while the other was assigned to 
be the "bad" stock, without the subject’s knowledge. The good stock dominated 
the bad stock in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance (Huang and 
Litzenberger, 1988). Specifically, outcomes of the good stock (i.e., +$10 with 
50% probability; +$0 with 25% probability; and -$10 with 25% probability) were 
better than outcomes of the bad stock (i.e., +$10 with 25% probability; +$0 with 
25% probability; and -$10 with 50% probability), on average for each trial. The 
bond paid $1 with 100% probability on each trial. Earnings were drawn 
independently from these distributions for each trial, and subjects were informed 
about the distributions before playing the task.  6 
Based on prior research, we first predicted that gain versus loss outcomes 
would activate the NAcc and mesial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) (Knutson et al., 
2003), and that loss versus gain outcomes would instead activate the anterior 
insula (Paulus et al., 2003). We then examined whether NAcc activation 
preceded both optimal and suboptimal stock (i.e., risky) choices, as well as 
whether anterior insula activation instead preceded both optimal and suboptimal 
bond (i.e., riskless) choices. 
Results 
Analyses of brain imaging data focused on changes in activation during 
outcome, market, and anticipation periods prior to a given choice. Analyses 
proceeded through two stages. In the first "localization" stage, we constructed 
group statistical maps to identify foci of interest and then verified the predicted 
patterns of activation with multivariate regressions. In the second "prediction" 
stage, we used activation extracted from these foci during the anticipation 
period to predict both optimal and suboptimal subsequent investment choices 
with logit regression models.  
In localization analyses of the outcome period, stock gain versus loss 
outcomes were associated with NAcc and MPFC activation at both the small 
volume corrected and global thresholds, as predicted (Knutson et al., 2003) 
(see Table 1 and Figure 2). Although the anterior insula did not show significant 
deactivation at the global threshold, bilateral foci did show the only 
deactivations in the brain for this contrast that passed the small volume 
corrected threshold (TC=-39,19,7; Z=-2.99; TC=38,19,11; Z=-2.99). Other 7 
regions that passed the global threshold included right orbitofrontal cortex, left 
anterior cingulate, left precuneus, and left posterior cingulate, replicating prior 
findings (Knutson et al., 2003). Multiple regression of VOI data (hemodynamic 
lag=4 sec) verified that after prior stock choice, gain outcomes were associated 
with increased NAcc and MPFC activation (p’s<.05; see Table S1).  
In analyses of the market period, relative gain outcomes (i.e. larger 
difference between the outcome of the chosen versus unchosen stock) were 
also associated with NAcc and MPFC activation at the small volume corrected 
and global thresholds, as predicted (see Table 2 and Figure 2). Other areas that 
passed the global threshold included left middle frontal gyrus, bilateral caudate, 
left putamen, and dorsomedial thalamus. Multivariate regression of VOI data 
verified that after a stock choice, relative gain outcomes increased NAcc and 
MPFC activation. Conversely, relative loss outcomes increased anterior insula 
activation (see Table S2). After a bond choice, relative gain outcomes (i.e., 
either of the stocks performed worse than the bond) increased MPFC activation 
(see Table S3). 
While not the focus of this study, uncertainty correlated maximally and 
negatively with bilateral anterior cingulate foci, easily exceeding the global 
threshold (TC: +4,16,45, Z=-5.37, -4,16,45, Z=-6.99). Further analysis of 
anticipatory activation extracted from these foci revealed that activation was not 
greatest with maximal uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty=.5, corresponding to minimal 
information about which stock to choose), but rather with maximal conflict (i.e., 
uncertainty=.3, corresponding to minimal information about whether to choose 8 
the stock or the bond). Specifically, activation in this region was -.08±.01 
(mean±SEM, n=2100) when uncertainty was less than .25; -.05±.01 (n=868) 
when uncertainty was between .25-.35; and -.15±.02 (n=832) when uncertainty 
was greater than .35. Additionally, anterior cingulate anticipatory activation 
robustly predicted subjects’ subsequent reaction time (t(3718)=7.92, R
2=.15 in a 
linear regression model that included subject fixed effects). Thus, anticipatory 
anterior cingulate activation correlated most robustly not with uncertainty, which 
was greatest when it was unclear which stock to choose, but rather with conflict, 
which was greatest when it was unclear whether to choose a stock or the bond. 
However, anticipatory anterior cingulate activation did not correlate with 
subsequent choice, as described below. 
In prediction analyses, we included anticipatory NAcc, MPFC, and anterior 
insula activation (lag=4 sec) in logistic regression models of subsequent choice, 
after incorporating relevant behavioral variables (see Tables 3-5). Adding 
activation from control regions (i.e., bilateral anterior cingulate, orbitofrontal 
cortex, medial caudate, and amygdala) did not increase explanatory power, and 
so data from these regions were not included in subsequent prediction 
analyses.  
Logistic regressions indicated that anticipatory NAcc and anterior insula 
activation were correlated with subsequent choice, and that these associations 
critically depended upon prior choice. For all choices, anticipatory NAcc 
activation increased the likelihood of choosing a stock only when the prior 
choice was a bond (a 0.1% increase in NAcc activation led to a 0.06% increase 9 
in the odds of choosing a stock; p<0.05). When the prior choice was a stock, 
anticipatory anterior insula activation increased the likelihood of choosing the 
bond (a 0.1% increase in anterior insula activation led to a 0.08% increase in 
the odds of choosing a bond; p<0.05; see Table 3 and Figure 3). MPFC 
activation did not correlate with subsequent choice. Thus, high NAcc activation 
preceded switching to risk-seeking choices, while high anterior insula activation 
preceded switching to risk-averse choices.  
Logistic regressions also indicated that anticipatory NAcc and anterior 
insula activation were correlated with the types of mistakes that subjects made. 
When the prior choice was riskless (i.e., the bond), anticipatory NAcc activation 
increased the likelihood of making a risk-seeking mistake (a 0.1% increase in 
NAcc activation led to a 0.07% increase in the odds of making a risk-seeking 
mistake; p<0.05). Also, anticipatory NAcc activation decreased the likelihood of 
making a risk-aversion mistake (a 0.1% increase in NAcc activation led to a 
0.06% decrease in the odds of making a risk-aversion mistake; p<0.05). When 
the prior choice was risky (i.e., a stock), anterior insula activation increased the 
likelihood of making a risk-aversion mistake (a 0.1% increase in insula 
activation led to a 0.11% increase in odds of making a risk-aversion mistake; 
p<0.05; see Tables 4-5 and Figure 3). MPFC activation was not correlated with 
subsequent mistakes. Thus, anticipatory neural activation correlated with both 
optimal and suboptimal subsequent choices, even after controlling for 
behavioral variables that should have been the primary determinants of those 
choices. 10 
Finally, we investigated whether individual differences in average 
anticipatory activation correlated with subsequent choice, after establishing that 
average anticipatory activation varied across individuals. Because regression of 
anticipatory NAcc activation on subject fixed effects yielded no significant 
differences, relationships between individual differences in anticipatory NAcc 
activation and choice were not examined further. On the other hand, regression 
of anticipatory anterior insula activation on subject fixed effects did yield 
significant differences in 8 (p’s<.05) of 19 subjects, suggesting some individual 
differences in anticipatory insula activation. Individual differences in average 
anterior insula activation during anticipation were significantly correlated with 
the frequency of choosing a bond after having chosen a stock (t(17)=2.14, 
p<.05; R
2=.21). Additionally, individual differences in average anterior insula 
activation during anticipation were also significantly correlated with the 
frequency of risk-aversion mistakes after having chosen a stock (t(17)=2.10, 
p<.05, R
2=.21). Thus, individual differences in anticipatory anterior insula 
activation were related to making subsequent riskless choices and risk-aversion 
mistakes.  
Discussion 
While NAcc activation preceded both risky choices and risk-seeking 
mistakes, anterior insula activation preceded both riskless choices and risk-
aversion mistakes. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that NAcc 
represents gain prediction (Knutson et al., 2001), while anterior insula 
represents loss prediction (Paulus et al., 2003). This is the first brain imaging 11 
study to operationalize optimal choices, which by extension allows the 
identification of suboptimal choices. According to financial models, one can 
define risk-neutral choices based on Bayesian updating as rational, and 
deviations from these choices as irrational. The results therefore indicate that 
above and beyond contributing to rational choice, anticipatory neural activation 
may also promote irrational choice. Thus, financial decision-making may require 
a delicate balance – recruitment of distinct circuits may be necessary for taking 
or avoiding risks, but excessive activation of one mechanism or the other may 
lead to mistakes. 
While the observation that NAcc activation is correlated with subsequent 
risk taking and risk-seeking mistakes agrees with a gain prediction account of 
NAcc function (Knutson et al., 2001), the current findings are not as consistent 
with alternative accounts. Motor preparation accounts predict equal activation 
prior to motor acts of equal force (Mogenson et al., 1980), and so cannot 
explain the NAcc’s prediction of risk-seeking but not risk-averse choices, since 
both required active choices indicated by button presses. Similarly, a saliency 
account predicts equal activation during anticipation of both large gains and 
losses (Zink et al., 2003), and so cannot account for the NAcc’s prediction of 
risk-seeking but not risk-averse choices. Finally, a behavioral switching account 
predicts that NAcc activation will increase prior to any switch from a repeated 
behavior to a novel behavior (Robbins et al., 1986). While the influence of the 
NAcc in biasing choice was most pronounced when subjects switched from risk-
averse to risk-seeking choices, NAcc activation did not predict switches in the 
opposite direction (from risk-seeking to risk-averse choices). The same 12 
arguments apply in reverse to the anterior insula predicting risk-averse choices. 
In either case, theories that fail to include the anticipated subjective value of an 
outcome cannot easily account for the observed pattern of results. 
Although both actual and relative gain outcomes increased activation in 
the MPFC, MPFC activation did not predict subsequent risk-taking behavior, 
consistent with its proposed role in representing gain prediction error rather than 
gain prediction (Knutson et al., 2003). Gain outcomes also activated other 
regions implicated in decision-making (e.g., orbitofrontal cortex, medial caudate, 
anterior cingulate cortex), but activation in these regions also did not predict 
subsequent risk-taking behavior. While activation in these regions do not 
correlate with subsequent risk taking, these regions may still play other 
important roles in decision-making (O'Doherty et al., 2003). For instance, 
anterior cingulate foci showed increased activation under conditions of 
increased response conflict, consistent with the postulated role of this region in 
conflict monitoring (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004).  
The BIAS task offers a number of advantages in eliciting financial choice 
behavior. First, because the BIAS task utilizes monetary incentives in a dynamic 
setting, our findings may generalize to real-world trading scenarios. Second, the 
BIAS task enables identification of both optimal choices and suboptimal 
choices. Third, the BIAS task elicits a range of behaviors from each individual, 
including both risk-seeking and risk-averse choices. Fourth, the event-related 
design of the study allowed us to correlate anticipatory rather than concurrent 13 
neural activation with choice by temporally isolating anticipatory activation and 
controlling for key antecedent behavioral variables (i.e., earnings, uncertainty).  
While the event-related analyses ensured that both anticipatory activation 
and decision-making occurred prior to actual choice, the dynamic nature of the 
BIAS task leaves open the question of whether anticipatory activation preceded 
decision-making or the reverse. Some of the present findings support the idea 
that activation preceded decision-making. Specifically, the link between 
activation and subsequent choice critically depended upon prior choice. For 
example, if NAcc activation simply reflected the decision to pick a stock, then 
the relationship between NAcc activation and the likelihood of choosing a stock 
should not depend upon prior choice. However, anticipatory NAcc activation 
significantly predicted the likelihood of subsequent stock choice only if the bond 
was picked on the previous trial (see Table 3). The same argument also applies 
to insula activation. Future research that specifically manipulates anticipatory 
activation could further establish whether such activation influences decisions. 
The dynamic nature of the BIAS task may have obscured stable individual 
differences in NAcc activation, which might influence subsequent choice, but 
are more evident in stationary tasks (Knutson et al., 2005). However, even 
during this dynamic task, significant individual differences were evident in insula 
activation during anticipation, and these predicted switching from risky to 
riskless choices as well as the likelihood of making risk aversion mistakes while 
doing so. The link between individual differences in anterior insula activation 14 
and subsequent risk-averse choices replicates and extends prior findings 
(Paulus et al., 2003).   
While experts and nonexperts who differed in terms of prior coursework in 
finance and statistics did not significantly differ in behavior in this experiment, 
future research should also examine the influence of individual differences in 
trading experience on financial risk taking, since psychophysiological evidence 
suggests that experienced traders may show less emotional responsiveness to 
market events than inexperienced traders (Lo and Repin, 2002). While many 
psychophysiological measures (e.g., skin conductance, heart rate, pupillary 
dilation) index anticipatory arousal, the current results suggest that measures 
that probe anticipatory valence will also be necessary to predict the likelihood of 
subsequent risky choice.  
Overall, these findings suggest that risk-seeking choices (such as 
gambling at a casino) and risk-averse choices (such as buying insurance) may 
be driven by two distinct neural circuits involving the NAcc and the anterior 
insula. The findings are consistent with the notion that activation in the NAcc 
and anterior insula respectively index positive and negative anticipatory 
affective states, and that activating one of these two regions can lead to a shift 
in risk preferences. This may explain why casinos surround their guests with 
reward cues (i.e., inexpensive food, free liquor, surprise gifts, potential jackpot 
prizes) -- anticipation of rewards activates the NAcc, which may lead to an 
increase in the likelihood of individuals switching from risk-averse to risk-15 
seeking behavior. A similar story in reverse may apply for the marketing 
strategies employed by insurance companies.  
Consideration of risk necessarily involves weighing potential gains against 
potential losses. The notion that distinct neural mechanisms anticipate gain 
versus loss suggests a novel componential view of risk taking.  Combined with 
such a view, these findings provide neural targets for investigating complex risk 
phenomena such as loss aversion, in which people weigh losses more than 
gains of equivalent size (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). These findings further 
imply that neuroeconomic research may foster a more comprehensive theory of 
individual decision-making than the rational actor model and thus, may 
ultimately yield new insights relevant to economic policy and institutional design. 
Experimental Procedures 
Nineteen healthy volunteers (10 females, mean age=27, range=24-39 
years, right-handed) participated in the study. Prior to entering the scanner, 
subjects played a practice version of the investment task for at least 10 minutes, 
minimizing learning effects. Subjects were then shown the cash they could earn 
by performing the task successfully, and correctly reported believing that they 
would receive cash at the end of the experiment contingent upon their 
performance. Subjects received a fixed compensation of $20 per hour, as well 
as a tenth of their total task earnings. They were also informed that it was 
possible to lose money on the task, and that any losses would be deducted 
from their total payment. 16 
To elicit a range of investment behavior, subjects included both “experts” 
and “nonexperts,” depending on whether they had taken prior graduate 
coursework in statistics and finance. Experts included Ph.D. students in 
Finance, Economics, or Accounting; while nonexperts included Ph.D. students 
in Humanities at Stanford University, to equate age, socioeconomic status, 
education and intelligence. A 2 (expert versus nonexpert-between) X 20 (block-
within) analysis of variance revealed a main effect of block (F(19,323)=2.35, 
p<.005), indicating that subjects chose the bond more often as the experiment 
progressed. However, experts and nonexperts did not significantly differ in 
choice of stocks versus bonds, either overall (54±6% vs 53±6%) or across 
blocks. Experts and nonexperts also did not significantly differ in the proportion 
of risk-seeking mistakes (26±6% vs. 35±8%; t(17)=.88, n.s.) or risk-aversion 
mistakes they made overall (23±6% vs. 29±6%; t(17)=.67, n.s.; calculated as 
percentage of mistakes made on trials where mistakes of that type were 
possible), suggesting more of a performance continuum than distinct groupings. 
Since choices and mistakes did not significantly differ between experts and 
nonexperts, we combined groups in subsequent analyses.  
Behavioral analysis. In the context of the BIAS task, the optimal strategy of 
a rational, risk-neutral agent is to pick a stock if he or she expects to receive a 
dividend that is at least as large as the bond earnings. Since the actual 
monetary amounts at stake in each trial were small (-$1 to $1), we used risk-
neutrality as the baseline model of investor behavior (Rabin, 2000), a model 
which assumes that individuals maximize expected return. A rational actor 
should also update his or her beliefs about the probability of each stock being 17 
optimal according to Bayes’ rule. Based on these assumptions, we derived the 
optimal portfolio selection strategy, which was the same for all trials (see 
Supplementary Material).  
For each trial, the objective probability of each of the two stocks being 
dominant can be computed using Bayes’ rule. We refer to the minimum of these 
two probabilities as ”uncertainty” for that trial. Uncertainty is highest (and equal 
to 0.5) at the beginning of a block, when the probability of either stock being 
optimal is 50%, and decreases as more information about dividends is revealed, 
clarifying which stock dominates. On trials where uncertainty was 0.3 or lower, 
the optimal choice was one of the stocks – otherwise, the optimal choice was 
the bond. Thus, when uncertainty is close to the threshold value of 0.3, it is 
most difficult for subjects to determine the optimal strategy (i.e., whether to 
choose a bond versus stock), leading to maximum conflict. Thus, uncertainty is 
maximal when subjects cannot distinguish which of the two stocks is better, 
while conflict is maximal when subjects cannot distinguish whether it is better to 
choose a stock or the bond.  
For each trial, we compared subjects’ investment choices to those of a 
rational, risk-neutral agent. Deviations from this model were defined as different 
types of “mistakes.” These mistakes fell into three categories. Subjects might: 
(1) pick a stock when the bond was the optimal choice (“risk-seeking mistake”); 
(2) pick the bond when a stock was the optimal choice (“risk-aversion mistake”); 
or (3) pick a stock when the other stock is the optimal choice (“confusion 
mistake”). Confusion mistakes occurred in less than 1% of the trials and thus 18 
were not considered in subsequent analyses. We used logit models to predict 
the likelihood of choosing a stock or make either type of mistake conditional, as 
well as unconditional, on prior choice.  
We predicted that several behavioral variables would influence 
subsequent choice (i.e., prior choice, prior outcome, relative earnings of chosen 
versus unchosen assets, cumulative earnings, and uncertainty). Logistic 
regressions indicated that when the prior choice was a stock, lower relative 
earnings reduced the likelihood of choosing a stock again (see Table 3). When 
the prior choice was a bond, lower relative earnings increased the likelihood of 
switching to a stock. Moreover, as predicted and independent of prior choice, 
increasing uncertainty increased the likelihood of choosing the bond. These 
predicted findings provided behavioral evidence for the validity of the task. 
Additionally, and independent of prior choice, increasing cumulative 
earnings increased the likelihood of choosing a bond (see Table 3). When the 
prior choice was a stock, increasing cumulative earnings also decreased the 
likelihood of making a risk-seeking mistake. When the prior choice was a stock, 
decreased relative earnings increased the likelihood of making a risk-aversion 
mistake (see Table 4). On the other hand, when the prior choice was a bond, 
decreased relative earnings increased the likelihood of making a risk-seeking 
mistake (see Table 5). Outcomes also influenced subsequent choice. When the 
prior choice was a stock, increasing outcome increased the likelihood of a 
choosing a bond as well as the likelihood of making a risk-aversion mistake 
(see Tables 3 and 4). Because behavioral variables including prior outcome, 19 
relative earnings of the chosen versus unchosen asset, cumulative earnings, 
and uncertainty all influenced subsequent choice, we included them as 
covariates in prediction analyses. 
fMRI acquisition. Images were acquired with a 1.5-T General Electric MRI 
scanner using a standard birdcage quadrature head coil. Twenty-four 4-mm-
thick slices (in-plane resolution 3.75 X 3.75 mm, no gap) extended axially from 
the mid-pons to the top of the skull, providing adequate spatial resolution of 
subcortical regions of interest (e.g., midbrain, ventral striatum). Functional 
scans of the whole brain were acquired every 2 sec (TR=2 sec) with a T2*-
sensitive in-/out- spiral pulse sequence (TE=40 ms, flip=90°) designed to 
minimize signal dropout at the base of the brain (Glover and Law, 2001). High-
resolution structural scans were subsequently acquired using a T1-weighted 
spoiled grass sequence (TR=100 ms; TE=7 ms, flip=90°), facilitating 
subsequent localization and coregistration of functional data. 
fMRI Analysis. Localization analyses were conducted using Analysis of 
Functional Neural Images (AFNI) software (Cox, 1996). For preprocessing, 
voxel time series were sinc interpolated to correct for nonsimultaneous slice 
acquisition within each volume, concatenated across runs, and corrected for 
three-dimensional motion. Visual inspection of motion correction estimates 
confirmed that no subject’s head moved more than 2.0 mm in any dimension 
from one volume acquisition to the next. Preprocessed time series were 
submitted to a regression model that included three regressors indexing 20 
residual motion, and six regressors modeling baseline, linear, and quadratic 
trends for each of the two runs. 
Regressors of interest were convolved with a gamma-variate function that 
modeled a canonical hemodynamic response prior to inclusion in regression 
models (Cohen, 1997). Maps of t-statistics for regressors of interest were 
transformed into Z-scores, coregistered with structural maps, spatially 
normalized by warping to Talairach space, slightly spatially smoothed (FWHM = 
4 mm) to minimize the effects of anatomical variability, resampled at 2 mm
3, 
and combined into a group map using a meta-analytic formula (average 
Z*sqrt(n)) (Knutson et al., 2000). Thresholds for statistical significance within the 
predicted volumes of interest (i.e., NAcc, anterior insula, and MPFC) were 
determined by a local small volume correction (3 4 mm radius spheres or 12.56 
4 mm
3 voxels corrected at p<.05 yields a threshold Z of 2.88, p<.004 
uncorrected), and required a minimum cluster of 4 contiguous voxels. 
Thresholds for statistical significance outside the predicted volumes of interest 
were set using a global family wise error rate that corrected for gray matter 
volume in subcortical and mesial prefrontal cortical regions (approximately 500 
4 mm
3 voxels corrected at p<.05 yields a threshold Z of 3.88, p<.0001 
uncorrected (Knutson et al., 2000)), and required a minimum cluster of 4 
contiguous voxels.  
As indicated by behavioral analyses, all fMRI analyses included covariate 
regressors representing cumulative earnings (defined as current wealth earned 
during the task, updated at each outcome period) and uncertainty (updated at 
each market period). For outcome analyses, regressors of interest contrasted 21 
stock versus bond choice, as well as gain versus loss outcome predicated on 
stock choice. Because the BIAS task is a dynamic reward learning task, we 
predicted that gain versus loss outcomes would activate both the NAcc (gain 
prediction) and MPFC (gain prediction error) (Knutson et al., 2003) and 
deactivate the anterior insula (Paulus et al., 2003). For market analyses, the 
regressor of interest contrasted amount earned on the current stock choice 
versus possible earnings from the unchosen stock, predicated on prior stock 
choice. As with actual outcomes, we predicted that better relative earnings 
during the market period would also activate the NAcc and MPFC.  
Volumes of interest (VOIs) were specified as 8 mm diameter spheres 
centered on foci identified in the outcome analysis in the NAcc, MPFC, and 
insula (see Table 1), thereby ensuring that equal amounts of data were 
extracted for each subject in each region. Visual inspection confirmed that VOIs 
encompassed only gray matter for each individual subject (Knutson et al., 
2004). Additional control volumes of interest of the same size and shape were 
specified in the bilateral anterior cingulate at foci correlated with uncertainty 
(TC: +/-4,16,45), in the bilateral orbitofrontal cortex at foci correlated with 
outcome (TC +/-26,36,-8), and in the bilateral amygdala (TC: +/-22, -10,-26), 
and bilateral medial caudate (TC: +/-10,7,10) based on the Talairach atlas, in 
order to verify local specificity of predicted effects. 
Prediction analyses were conducted on activation timecourse data that was 
spatially averaged and extracted from these VOIs. Prediction analyses tested 
whether NAcc activation during anticipation was associated with subsequent 
stock choice as well as risk-seeking mistakes, after controlling for potential 22 
behavioral confounds. Prediction analyses also tested whether anterior insula 
activation during anticipation was associated with subsequent bond choice as 
well as risk-aversion mistakes, after controlling for potential behavioral 
confounds. Additional analyses utilized identical models, but substituted data 
extracted from control VOIs.  
Individual differences analyses were conducted by first using logistic 
regressions to determine whether subject fixed effects alone had a significant 
influence on VOI activation during anticipation. Given sufficient variability across 
subjects in activation during anticipation (e.g., fixed effects were significant in 
over 25% of the subjects), logistic regressions were conducted that examined 
the effects of individual differences in average VOI activation during anticipation 
on the frequency of choosing the stock versus the bond, as well as on the 
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Table 1:  Activation foci for choice outcome: Contrast of gain versus loss 
following stock choice.  
 
Region Z-score  Tal.  Coordinates 
L MPFC  5.34  -3,56,4 
L MPFC*  5.47  -3,49,0 
R OFC  3.89  22,36,-8 
R NAcc  6.41  11,12,-3 
L NAcc*  5.82  -13,8,-4 
L Ant. Cing  4.07  -1,-1,34 
L Precuneus  4.71  -1,-33,43 
L Post. Cing.  5.11  -3,-34,27 
 30 
 
Table 2:  Activation foci for market outcome: Contrast of chosen stock versus 
unchosen stock value.  
 
Region Z-score  Tal.  Coordinates 
L MFG  3.93  -3,56,8 
L MPFC  4.26  -3,49,-5 
L Caudate  4.46  -7,19,8 
R Caudate  4.59  7,19,8 
L Putamen  4.14  -20,9,-2 
DM Thalamus  5.00  -1,-7,12 
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Table 3:  Logit estimation of the probability of choosing a stock or bond in trial t. 
The dependent variable, StockChoicet, is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a 




ANT are activations in the left NAcc, MPFC and anterior insula in the 
Anticipation period of trial t. RelEarningst is equal to the difference between the 
dividends on trial t of the stock not chosen and those of the chosen stock. If the 
asset chosen in trial t was the bond, RelEarningst is equal to the maximum 
dividend paid by the two stocks on that trial. Outcomet is equal to the earnings 
made on trial t. Uncertaintyt is the uncertainty of the choice and defined as 
min(Pr{Stock T = Good | History}, Pr{Stock R = Good | History}). CumEarningst 
is wealth accumulated during the task up to and including trial t. Subject fixed 
effects included, with robust standard errors. Inclusion of brain variables 






Previous choice was 
a stock 
Previous choice was 
the bond  All data 
StockChoicet  Coef Coef Coef 
lNAcct
ANT  -0.0498 0.5889  0.3192 
   (0.24) (3.21)***  (2.70)*** 
lMPFCt
ANT  -0.0461 -0.0222 -0.0137 
   (0.26) (0.15) (0.14) 
linsulat
ANT  -0.7875 0.1910  -0.2359 
   (3.04)*** (0.89)  (1.69)* 
RelEarningst-1  -0.0550 0.0447  -0.0360 
   (5.18)*** (4.08)*** (6.65)*** 
Outcomet-1  -0.0253   -0.0452 
   (1.88)*   (4.65)*** 
Uncertaintyt  -4.7256 -8.8818 -8.1441 
   (7.68)*** (12.89)***  (21.42)*** 
CumEarningst-1  -0.0036 -0.0017 -0.0031 
   (3.43)*** (1.99)**  (5.51)*** 
Constant  2.7542 1.8624 2.7986 
   (7.37)***  (5.30)***  (12.33)*** 
Observations 1578  1595  3367 
Pseudo R-sq  0.27  0.31  0.33 
Robust z statistics in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4:  Logit estimation of the probability of making a risk-aversion mistake in 
trial t. The dependent variable, RAMt (Risk-Aversion Mistake), is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the bond was chosen on trial t while the optimal choice 
was one of the stocks. lNAcct
ANT, lMPFCt
ANT and linsulat
ANT are activations in 
the left NAcc, MPFC and anterior insula in the Anticipation period of trial t. 
StockChoicet is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a stock was chosen, and 0 if 
the bond was chosen on trial t. RelEarningst is equal to the difference between 
the dividends on trial t of the stock not chosen and those of the chosen stock. If 
the asset chosen in trial t was the bond, RelEarningst is equal to the maximum 
dividend paid by the two stocks on that trial. Outcomet is equal to the earnings 
made on trial t. Uncertaintyt is the uncertainty of the choice and defined as 
min(Pr{Stock T = Good | History}, Pr{Stock R = Good | History}).CumEarningst 
is wealth accumulated during the task up to and including trial t. Subject fixed 
effects included, with robust standard errors. Inclusion of brain variables 




was a stock 
 
Previous choice 




RAMt  Coef Coef Coef 
lNAcct
ANT  0.2962 -0.5787  -0.1973 
   (1.11) (2.34)**  (1.21) 
lMPFCt
ANT  -0.1224 -0.1361 -0.1578 
   (0.52) (0.61) (1.11) 
linsulat
ANT  1.0985 0.1027 0.4973 
   (3.22)*** (0.34)  (2.56)** 
RelEarningst-1  0.0474 -0.0511  0.0384 
   (3.45)*** (3.20)*** (5.02)*** 
Outcomet-1  0.0495   0.0497 
   (2.47)**   (3.89)*** 
Uncertaintyt  3.9333 11.6122  11.7142 
   (2.25)** (7.52)***  (11.86)*** 
CumEarningst-1  0.0019 0.0016 0.0026 
   (1.40) (1.58) (3.67)*** 
Constant  -2.3645 -2.4798 -3.3136 
   (5.27)***  (5.11)***  (10.64)*** 
Observations 1015  694  1857 
Pseudo R-sq  0.26  0.21  0.25 
Robust z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 35 
Table 5:  Logit estimation of the probability of making a risk-seeking mistake in 
trial t. The dependent variable, RSMt (Risk-Seeking Mistake), is an indicator 




ANT are activations in the left NAcc, 
MPFC and anterior insula in the Anticipation period of trial t. StockChoicet is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if a stock was chosen, and 0 if the bond was 
chosen on trial t. RelEarningst is equal to the difference between the dividends 
on trial t of the stock not chosen and those of the chosen stock. If the asset 
chosen in trial t was the bond, RelEarningst is equal to the maximum dividend 
paid by the two stocks on that trial. Outcomet is equal to the earnings made on 
trial t. Uncertaintyt is the uncertainty of the choice (or uncertainty of the 
environment) and defined as min(Pr{Stock T = Good | History}, Pr{Stock R = 
Good | History}). CumEarningst is wealth accumulated during the task up to and 
including trial t. Subject fixed effects included, with robust standard errors. 




was a stock 
 
Previous choice 




RSMt  Coef Coef Coef 
lNAcct
ANT  0.3998 0.7395 0.4868 
   (0.93) (2.63)***  (2.69)*** 
lMPFCt
ANT  -0.4330 -0.1108 -0.1210 
   (1.44) (0.50) (0.81) 
linsulat
ANT  -0.6024 0.4430  -0.0577 
   (1.19) (1.30) (0.27) 
RelEarningst-1  -0.0838 0.0395  -0.0152 
   (3.81)*** (2.34)**  (1.67)* 
Outcomet-1  0.0037   -0.0416 
   (0.16)   (2.49)** 
Uncertaintyt  -12.4172 -14.6378 -8.8036 
   (6.20)*** (5.37)*** (8.07)*** 
CumEarningst-1  -0.0089 -0.0008 -0.0038 
   (4.32)*** (0.58)  (4.22)*** 
Constant  7.1203 3.1759 2.9538 
   (5.93)***  (2.58)***  (5.24)*** 
Observations 353  874  1295 
Pseudo R-sq  0.30  0.34  0.25 
Robust z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 37 








Figure 2:  Effect of actual and relative outcomes on neural activation 
(n=19). Top panels depict the contrast of large gains vs. large losses during the 
Outcome period following stock choice. Bottom panels depict the contrast of 





Figure 3: Association of anticipatory neural activation with subsequent 
choice. Left panel indicates a significant effect of anterior insula activation on 
the odds of making riskless (bond) choices and risk-aversion mistakes (RAM) 
after a stock choice (Stockt-1). Right panel indicates a significant effect of NAcc 
activation on the odds of making risk-aversion mistakes, risky choices, and risk-
seeking mistakes (RSM) after a bond choice (Bondt-1). The odds ratio for a 
given choice is defined as the ratio of the probability of making that choice 
divided by the probability of not making that choice. Percent change in odds 
ratio results from a 0.1% increase in NAcc or anterior insula activation; 
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Optimal Portfolio Selection Strategy 
 
During trial τ  in each block, a rational risk-neutral agent should pick stock i 
if he/she expects to receive a dividend D
i
τ  at least as large as the bond 
earnings, that is, if: 
E[D
i
τ |Iτ -1] >= E[DB
τ |Iτ -1] = 1, where Iτ -1 is the information set up to trial τ -1. 
That is: Iτ -1={D
i
t| ∀ t≤ τ -1, ∀ i∈ {Stock T, Stock R, Bond C}}. 
Let x
i
τ  = Pr{ Stock i = Good |Iτ -1}. Then: 
E[D
i
t|Iτ -1] = x
i
τ  [0.5 * 10 + 0.25 * (-10) + 0.25 * 0] + (1 - x
i
τ ) [0.5 * (-10) + 0.25 
* 10 + 0.25 * 0] = 2.5 * (2x
i
τ  - 1) 
Hence, a risk-neutral agent will pick stock i only when his belief x
i




τ  - 1)>=1 ⇔   x
i
τ  >= 0.7  
If the agent’s beliefs are weak, that is: x
i
τ <0.7, ∀ i ∈ {Stock T, Stock R}, then 
the optimal strategy for the risk-neutral agent is to pick the bond in trial τ . 42 
A rational agent should update his or her beliefs x
i
τ  according to Bayes’ 
rule. 





where i,j ∈ {StockT,StockR} and i ≠  j. Hence, the uncertainty is highest (and 
equal to 0.5) at the beginning of a block, because at that point the probability of 
either one of the stocks being the good one is 50%. The uncertainty decreases 
as more information about dividends is revealed and it becomes clearer which 





Table S1:  Determinants of left NAcc, anterior insula and MPFC activation 
during the OUTCOME period, for trials where a STOCK was chosen. 
CumEarningst is wealth accumulated during the task up to and including trial t. 
Uncertaintyt  is defined as min(Pr{Stock T = Good | History}, Pr{Stock R = Good 
| History}). +10.00t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the dividend paid by the 
stock on trial t was +10. -10.00t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the dividend 





t   linsul
OUT
t   lMPFC
OUT
t  
 Coef.  Coef.  Coef. 
-10.00t  -0.0138 0.0224 -0.0076 
 (0.56)  (1.21)  (0.26) 
+10.00t  0.0838 0.0013 0.1408 
 (3.85)***  (0.08)  (5.23)*** 
Uncertaintyt  -0.0322 0.0063 -0.1090 
 (0.49)  (0.14)  (1.59) 
CumEarningst-1  -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.16)  (1.07)  (1.30) 
Constant  0.1083 0.0992 -0.0219 
 (2.27)**  (2.57)**  (0.27) 
Observations 2036  2036  2036 
R-sq 0.0581  0.0518  0.0434 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors. * 
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table S2:  Determinants of left NAcc, anterior insula and MPFC activation 
during the MARKET period, for trials where a STOCK was chosen. 
CumEarningst is wealth accumulated during the task up to and including trial t. 
Outcomet are earnings made on trial t. Uncertaintyt  is defined as min(Pr{Stock 
T = Good | History}, Pr{Stock R = Good | History}).  +20t is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the difference between the dividend paid by the chosen stock and 
that paid by the not chosen stock is equal to +20. -20t  is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the difference between the dividend paid by the chosen stock and 
that paid by the not chosen stock is equal to -20. +10t and –10t are defined 





t   linsul
MKT
t   lMPFC
MKT
t  
 Coef.  Coef.  Coef. 
-20.00t  -0.0159 0.0551 0.0295 
  (0.46) (1.87)* (0.64) 
-10.00t  0.0227 0.0388 -0.0519 
  (0.80) (1.75)* (1.63) 
+10.00t  0.0525 -0.0174 0.0732 
 (2.23)**  (0.83)  (2.43)** 
+20.00t  0.0531 -0.0619 0.0918 
 (2.10)**  (2.78)***  (2.83)*** 
Outcomet  0.0015 0.0021 -0.0009 
  (1.08) (1.80)* (0.51) 
Uncertaintyt  0.0619 -0.0898 0.0513 
  (1.04) (1.70)* (0.71) 
CumEarningst-1  0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
  (0.85) (1.76)* (0.15) 45 
Constant  -0.1496 -0.1505 -0.2006 
 (3.94)***  (3.82)***  (2.42)** 
Observations 2036  2036  2036 
R-sq 0.0237  0.0314  0.0347 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors. * 
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table S3:  Determinants of left NAcc, anterior insula and MPFC activation 
during the MARKET period, for trials where the BOND was chosen. 
CumEarningst is wealth accumulated during the task up to and including trial t. 
Uncertaintyt  is defined as min(Pr{Stock T = Good | History}, Pr{Stock R = Good 
| History}). Since subjects chose the bond, which yielded +1, we define +11t as 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the maximum dividend paid by either stock 
was -10 (1-(-10)). –9t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the maximum dividend 






t   linsul
MKT
t   lMPFC
MKT
t  
-9.00t  -0.0280 0.0062 -0.0153 
 (1.23)  (0.32)  (0.63) 
+11.00t  -0.0318 0.0352 0.1199 
 (0.96)  (1.24)  (3.26)*** 
Uncertaintyt  -0.0788 -0.1976 -0.1531 
 (1.16)  (3.40)***  (2.04)** 
CumEarningst-1  -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.06)  (0.62)  (0.68) 
Constant  0.0615 0.0928 0.1307 
 (1.22)  (1.96)**  (1.58) 
Observations 1708  1708  1708 
R-sq 0.0161  0.0387  0.0548 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors. * 
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 